Chapter 2:
An Un-Orthodox Doctrine of Just War: Ivan Ilyin’s On Resistance to Evil by Force
An Un-Orthodox Doctrine of Just War: Ivan Ilyin’s On Resistance to Evil by Force
The Eastern Orthodox concept of symphonia is generally described as a normative theory according to which church and state complement and respect one another, with neither presuming to dominate. For a thorough analysis of "the origins of the concept of symphonia, its historical development, and its utilization by the Russian Orthodox Church as a normative ideal for church-state relations," (p. 474) see Mikhail Antonov, "Church-State Symphonia: Its Historical Development and its Applications by the Russian Orthodox Church," Journal of Law and Religion 35, no. 3 (December 2020): 474–493.
See, for example, Philip LeMasters, “Orthodox Perspectives on Peace, War and Violence,” Ecumenical Review 63, no. 1, (March 2011), 56. LeMasters observes, "In contrast to Western Christianity, there is no explicit just war theory in Eastern Orthodoxy. Certainly, the Byzantine Empire and other Orthodox nations have had rules of conduct for soldiers and expectations about when and how it was appropriate for nations to go to war. But even observance of the strictest moral and professional code does not make war good."
Ivan A. Ilyin, On Resistance to Evil by Force (Zvolen, Slovakia: Taxiarch Press, 2018), 4. See also the appendix of the Taxiarch edition for a translation of the ROC’s anathema of Tolstoy, 213–215.
With Ilyin’s life and intellectual afterlife so thoroughly covered in Chapter 1, I will forgo an introductory biography and proceed directly to my discussion of some of his ideas about authority and coercive force. I am concerned here with Ilyin’s best-known work: On Resistance to Evil by Force (1925). While scholars and pundits have in recent years tended to focus on the posthumous Our Tasks (1945) as an example of the dangers of his philosophy (no doubt for its unambiguously positive presentation of fascism), Ilyin’s moral justification of violence in On Resistance to Evil by Force offers greater insight into the role and influence of his ideas in Russia’s current cultural and political development.
I argue here that On Resistance to Evil by Force constitutes Ilyin’s attempt at an extra-canonical Russian Orthodox doctrine of just war (bellum iustum) and suggest that this finding helps to explain the recent resurgence of this text’s popularity. Furthermore, I argue that with On Resistance to Evil by Force Ilyin sought not only to give religious justification to the Russian Whites in violence (that is, war) against the Bolsheviks, but also that he sought to do so on specific philosophical and theological grounds. Although the concept of just war is inextricable from the related notions of authority (auctoritas) and sovereignty (potestas or imperium), which are central to the Orthodox concept of symphonia,1 just war as such is not recognized as canonical in Eastern Orthodox theology.2 Rather, the consensus of Orthodox theologians seems to be that, although war is sometimes inevitable, it is never “just.” Thus, the absence of a canonical Orthodox formulation of just war affords Ilyin the opportunity to put forward a version of the doctrine—a call to arms in which he links salvation to chauvinism. Yet this position of the Orthodox Church also forces Ilyin to disguise the real nature of his ideological project. For this reason, in part, he frames his moral-theological justification of coercive force as a rebuttal to Leo Tolstoy’s earlier case for pacifism in The Law of Love and the Law of Violence (1908). Using Tolstoy as a foil, Ilyin creates the appearance of merely amplifying the Russian Orthodox Church’s 1901 anathema of the late Tolstoy’s pacifist teachings while in fact laundering an extra-canonical doctrine of just war.3 Ultimately, I argue that Ilyin’s philosophy in On Resistance to Evil by Force is not only neither Russian nor Orthodox, but it is also little more than a Russian translation of the same medieval Catholic theology of just war that was used to justify the European Crusades.
I argue here that On Resistance to Evil by Force constitutes Ilyin’s attempt at an extra-canonical Russian Orthodox doctrine of just war (bellum iustum) and suggest that this finding helps to explain the recent resurgence of this text’s popularity. Furthermore, I argue that with On Resistance to Evil by Force Ilyin sought not only to give religious justification to the Russian Whites in violence (that is, war) against the Bolsheviks, but also that he sought to do so on specific philosophical and theological grounds. Although the concept of just war is inextricable from the related notions of authority (auctoritas) and sovereignty (potestas or imperium), which are central to the Orthodox concept of symphonia,1 just war as such is not recognized as canonical in Eastern Orthodox theology.2 Rather, the consensus of Orthodox theologians seems to be that, although war is sometimes inevitable, it is never “just.” Thus, the absence of a canonical Orthodox formulation of just war affords Ilyin the opportunity to put forward a version of the doctrine—a call to arms in which he links salvation to chauvinism. Yet this position of the Orthodox Church also forces Ilyin to disguise the real nature of his ideological project. For this reason, in part, he frames his moral-theological justification of coercive force as a rebuttal to Leo Tolstoy’s earlier case for pacifism in The Law of Love and the Law of Violence (1908). Using Tolstoy as a foil, Ilyin creates the appearance of merely amplifying the Russian Orthodox Church’s 1901 anathema of the late Tolstoy’s pacifist teachings while in fact laundering an extra-canonical doctrine of just war.3 Ultimately, I argue that Ilyin’s philosophy in On Resistance to Evil by Force is not only neither Russian nor Orthodox, but it is also little more than a Russian translation of the same medieval Catholic theology of just war that was used to justify the European Crusades.
[1] The Eastern Orthodox concept of symphonia is generally described as a normative theory according to which church and state complement and respect one another, with neither presuming to dominate. For a thorough analysis of "the origins of the concept of symphonia, its historical development, and its utilization by the Russian Orthodox Church as a normative ideal for church-state relations," (p. 474) see Mikhail Antonov, "Church-State Symphonia: Its Historical Development and its Applications by the Russian Orthodox Church," Journal of Law and Religion 35, no. 3 (December 2020): 474–493.
[2] See, for example, Philip LeMasters, “Orthodox Perspectives on Peace, War and Violence,” Ecumenical Review 63, no. 1, (March 2011), 56. LeMasters observes, "In contrast to Western Christianity, there is no explicit just war theory in Eastern Orthodoxy. Certainly, the Byzantine Empire and other Orthodox nations have had rules of conduct for soldiers and expectations about when and how it was appropriate for nations to go to war. But even observance of the strictest moral and professional code does not make war good."
[3] Ivan A. Ilyin, On Resistance to Evil by Force (Zvolen, Slovakia: Taxiarch Press, 2018), 4. See also the appendix of the Taxiarch edition for a translation of the ROC’s anathema of Tolstoy, 213–215.
[2] See, for example, Philip LeMasters, “Orthodox Perspectives on Peace, War and Violence,” Ecumenical Review 63, no. 1, (March 2011), 56. LeMasters observes, "In contrast to Western Christianity, there is no explicit just war theory in Eastern Orthodoxy. Certainly, the Byzantine Empire and other Orthodox nations have had rules of conduct for soldiers and expectations about when and how it was appropriate for nations to go to war. But even observance of the strictest moral and professional code does not make war good."
[3] Ivan A. Ilyin, On Resistance to Evil by Force (Zvolen, Slovakia: Taxiarch Press, 2018), 4. See also the appendix of the Taxiarch edition for a translation of the ROC’s anathema of Tolstoy, 213–215.
